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REGENT CASE COMMENTS
ered at least in part replaces money the parent must otherwise
expend for the child. Thus indemnity insurance against injuries
to third persons is made to serve the function of accident insurance
for the child. Second, under the terms of its contract, the insur-
ance company assumed the risk of liability which obviously was to
be determined independently of the existence of the contract. But
the court looks to the existence of this insurance contract as determi-
native of the primary liability. Thus liability under the contract
is controlled by the contract's existence rather than by its terms.
-PAr S. HUDINS.
TORTS - VIoL Tio OF STATUTE OR ORDINANCE AS PRIMA
FAciE NEGLIGENCE. - Plaintiff, a motorcycle officer, turned left
at an intersection from street A, passed to the right of a line of
automobiles that were waiting in the middle of street B for traffic
light to change, and was injured in attempting to pass between
the second car in line and defendant's automobile, parked at an
angle to the curb in violation of a municipal ordinance requiring
all motor vehicles to be parked parallel with the curb. It was
found that the plaintiff was without fault. Held: Defendant's
violation of the ordinance was prima facie neligence.'
There is general judicial adherence to the principle that the
violation of a statute enacted for the protection of others will af-
ford a right of recovery, when the violation was the natural and
proximate cause of an injury; 'but there is no uniformity as to
the legal effect of such conduct. A majority of the decisions hold
a violation is negligence per se,' a minority that it is prima facie
negligence, and in a few cases it is only evidence of negligence.'
In Kentucky the violation of an ordinance is not even evidence of
negligence.
'Oldfield v. Woodall, 166 S. E. 691 (W. Va., 1932).
2 U. S. Brewing Co. v. Stoltenberg, 211 Ill. 531, 71 N. E. 1081 (1904);
see citation in 20 R. C. L. 33. In a very recent case, State v. Cope, 167 S.
E. 456 (N. C., 1933), it was held that the intentional or willful violation of
a statute or ordinance, causing injury to another, is negligence that imports
criminal responsibility.
3 
cRickard v. Flint, 114 N. Y. 222 (1889); Southern By. Co. v. Johnson,
151 Va. 345, 143 S. E. 887 (1928).
'Richmond Traction Co. v. Clarke, 101 Va. 382, 43 S. E. 618 (1903);
Murphy v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 285 Pa. 399, 132 Atl. 194 (1926).
"Ford's Adm'r. v. Paducah City Ry., 124 Ky. 488, 99 S. W. 355 (1907);
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Dalton, 102 Ky. 290, 53 S. W. 431 (1897).
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Sometimes a distinction is made between the disregard of a
statute and an ordinance,' but the weight of authority is other-
wise.: The minority view, however, is apparently based on a
sound principle; namely, a city cannot regulate civil relations
in the absence of express delegation of the power by the legisla-
ture.8
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has at various
times rendered decisions representing the three mentioned rules,'
the only consistency being in the child labor cases where the prima
facie rule has been repeatedly applied.' The inconsistency was
recognized for the first time, apparently, in the instant case. Af-
ter referring to the fact the court concludes with the statement:
"We believe that the better rule considers the fact of the viola-
tion of a statute or ordinance as prima facie negligence, sufficient
to cause a directed verdict in the absence of any other showing, but
rebuttable."
Viewed simply as a common law problem of negligence," it is
OPhiladelphia & Reading Ry. v. Erwin, 89 Pa. 71 (1879); Bade v. Nies,
239 Mich. 37, 214 N. W. 171 (1927). See also Malburn, The Yiolation of
Laws Limiting Speed as Negligence (1911) 45 Am. L. REv. 220. In the
principal case the court simply declares that there is no distinction and cites
U. S. Brewing Co. v. Stoltenberg, supra n. 3.
7Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Skeel, 182 id. 593, 106 N. E. 365 (1914); Cornell
v. Burlington R. Co., 38 Ia. 120 (1874); Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn. 323, 23 N. W.
237 (1885; and Virginia M. Ry. Co. v. White's Adm'r., 84 Va. 498, 5 S. E.
573 (1888).
8Bain v. Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co., 116 Ark. 125, 172 S. W. 834
(1915), where it was said that a city could not enlarge the common law or
statutory lfabilities of its citizens.
0 Evidence of negligence, Krodel v. B. & 0. R. Co., 99 W. Va. 374, 128 S.
E. 824 (1925).
Prima facie negligence, Tarr v. Lumber Co., 106 W. Va. 99, 144 S. E. 878
(1929), and cases cited infra., n. 10.
Negligence per se, Ambrose v. Young, 100 W. Va. 452, 130 S. E. 810 (1925)
(driving an automobile past speed limit set by city ordinance); Melton v.
C. & 0. Ry. Co., 71 W. Va. 701, 78 S. E. 369 (1913) (backing a car over a
crossing without warning in violation of an ordinance); Bowles v. C. & 0. By.
Co., 61 W. Va. 272, 57 S. E. 131 (1907) ; Ashley v. Kanawha Valley Traction
Co., 60 W. Va. 306, 55 S. E. 1016 (1906) (where a street car was moving
beyond speed limit set by city council).
"Bowling v. Guyan Lumber Co., 105 W. V. 309, 143 S. E. 86 (1928);
Thompson v. Coal & Coke Co., 104 W. Va. 135, 139 S. E. 642 (1927); Wills
v. Gas Coal Co., 104 W. Va. 19, 138 S. E. 749 (1927) ; Bobbs v. Morgantown
Press Co., 89 W. Va. 206, 108 S. E. 879 (1921); Waldron v. Garland Poca-
hontas Coal Co., 89 W. Va. 426, 109 S. E. 729 (1921); Mangus v. Coal Co.,
87 W. Va. 718, 105 S. E. 909 (1921); Griffith v. American Coal Co., 75 W.
Va. 686, 84 S. E. 621 (1915); Dickinson v. Stewart Colliery Co., 71 W. Va.
325, 76 S. E. 654 (1912) ; Blankenship v. Coal Co., 69 W. Va. 74, 70 S. B. 863
(1911) ; Daniel v. Big Sandy C. & C. Co., 68 W. Va. 491, 69 S. B. 993 (1910) ;
Norman v. Coal Co., 68 W. Va. 405, 69 S. B. 875 (1910). See Note (1922) 28
W. VA. L. Q. 233.
UAs a matter of statutory interpretation there is serious doubt that an
enactment of the sort involved in the principal case regulates civil relations.
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believed that the per se rule imposes too much faith in a statutory
standard supported solely by a criminal sanction by accepting it
as an unvarying civil standard.' The prima facie rule is not open
to this objection nor is it subject to the criticism that it makes the
civil effect of a violation of a statutory criminal standard an un-
known quantity calculated to add to the uncertainty of jury litiga-
tion, a charge that may fairly be made against the evidence of
negligence view.
-CHARrZS W. CALDWELL.
The courts are inclined to confuse this phase of the problem with the com-
mon law angle discussed in the text. See Norman v. Coal Co., 68 W. Va. 405,
69 S. E. 857 (1910). See generally, Thayer's article, Public Wrongs and
Private Wrongs (1914) 27 HAnv. L. REv. 317; Lowndes, Civil Liability
Created by Criminal Legislation (1932) 16 M m. L. REV. 361 and Morris,
The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability (1932) 46 HAMW. L. REv.
453.
'2The nuisance situation is a suggestive analogy. It is common learning
that courts will not accept as final the judgment of municipal bodies as
to what is a nuisance, apart from nuisances per se under common law
standards. See JoYcE, LAw or NUIsAxcEs (1906) § 330 et seq. Why im.
pose greater confidence in the judgment of municipal bodies in the negligence
set-upI
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